Wisconsin Right to Life: Same Song, Different Verse by Hayward, Allison R.
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 27 
Number 2 Elections in the Information Age: 
Making Your Money and Your Vote Count 
(Volume XXVII, No. 2) 
Article 5 
2008 
Wisconsin Right to Life: Same Song, Different Verse 
Allison R. Hayward 
George Mason University School of Law, ahayward@campaignfreedom.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hayward, Allison R. (2008) "Wisconsin Right to Life: Same Song, Different Verse," Saint Louis University 
Public Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
309 
WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE: SAME SONG, DIFFERENT VERSE 
ALLISON R. HAYWARD* 
The Supreme Court’s FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life1 (WRTL II) decision 
is unfortunately unremarkable.  It fits comfortably into a legacy of decisions in 
which the Supreme Court has toyed with Congress’s ability to restrict the 
political speech of “outside groups.”  Accordingly, I cannot agree with 
Professor Hill that the decision represents an agenda-setting or framework-
defining departure from the Court’s previous campaign finance decisions. 
In these previous cases, as with the WRTL II decision, the Court has 
offered a schizophrenic vision of political regulation.  It seems unable to 
conclude whether the independent opinions of certain social actors, spread 
among the public via the “expenditure” of their funds, pose a corrupting danger 
to campaigns or elections that justifies deference to Congress’s regulatory 
choices.  If it does, Congress should have the power to restrict such pernicious 
activity.  If it does not, Congress should not be given such power. 
But, because the Court cannot decide, it has instead developed an “in-but-
not-in” alternative, which permits Congress and state legislatures to restrict the 
independent speech of corporations and labor organizations (aliens, too, but we 
won’t discuss them here) if the message is “too political.”2  For brevity’s sake I 
will refer to these as “prohibited sources.”  For some time, “too political” has 
meant that the speech either expressly advocated the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate,3 or (in earlier decisions and in some administrative 
enforcement matters) involved “active electioneering.”4 
When activists found ways to talk about politics notwithstanding this 
restriction, through much-maligned “issue advertising,” Congress limited this 
speech with its own “electioneering” statute, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 1. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 2. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000) (prohibiting corporate or labor expenditures “in 
connection with” federal elections). 
 3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41–44 (1976). 
 4. Untied States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957); United States v. Lewis Food Co., 
236 F. Supp. 849, 853 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (using electioneering as a standard for statutory 
violation), rev’d on other grounds, 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966); Note, Corporate and Labor 
Activity in Federal Elections: “Active Electioneering” as a Constitutional Standard, 49 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 761, 773 (1981). 
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Act (BCRA).5  Under the BCRA, corporations and unions were prohibited 
from funding broadcast communications that featured a clearly identified 
candidate and targeted the candidate’s district within thirty days of the 
candidate’s primary election or within sixty days of the general election.6  The 
litigants in WRTL II argued successfully that this law, as applied to them, 
impermissibly burdened their speech rights.7 
Accordingly, the Court had reason once again to consider what 
corporations and unions should be permitted to do in campaigns.  After WRTL 
II, “too political” now includes only speech that is “the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.”8  Spending on messages that discuss policy issues 
involving candidates remains beyond the reach of regulation and is protected 
by the First Amendment unless the message contains the “functional 
equivalent of express advocacy”9 
One would assume, following conventional First Amendment doctrine, 
that the Court would have found some compelling state interest to support such 
a blanket rule.  But, it has not,10 and WRTL II perpetuates this oversight. 
If the First Amendment preserves the liberty of Americans to speak, 
particularly about politics, then the present doctrine seems backwards.11 It 
seems the most protection should be extended to electoral advocacy, which is 
the most salient to popular sovereignty and an area where congressional 
incumbents might be the most tempted to regulate in ways that tip the scales in 
their favor. 
Several arguments attempt to refute the contention that corporate or labor 
advocacy deserves full First Amendment protection. But none do the necessary 
work to justify banning express advocacy by corporations and unions. As these 
rationales are plainly insufficient, the Court should either declare the corporate 
 
 5. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 91 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 36 U.S.C.). 
 6. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c) (Supp. III 2005). 
 7. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2007). 
 8. Id. 
 9. The Court failed to define “functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 
 10. The closest it has come is in dicta in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 659–60 (1990) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (“[The 
Court] has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent 
corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate 
elections.”)).  This stands, I believe, as a stunning exception to the general rule that content-based 
speech restrictions are disfavored and only survive scrutiny if the speech falls within a few 
narrowly defined categories, i.e., constitutes a clear and present danger of imminent unlawful 
action or is defamatory.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791–92 (2d ed. 
1978). 
 11. See, e.g., Mills v. Ala., 384 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1966) (holding unconstitutional a state 
statute restricting newspaper editors’ freedom in publishing editorials on day of election). 
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and labor expenditure ban unconstitutional or craft a sufficient rationale for it 
grounded in First Amendment doctrine. 
One common argument made is that participation by prohibited sources is 
unfair: Corporations and unions are using other people’s money via a state-
sanctioned vehicle and can exert disproportionate influence.12  This rationale is 
more appropriate for corporations  than labor unions because the corporate 
form is designed to facilitate the accumulation of funds for business purposes.  
Corporate control rests with a set of managers whose political agenda can be 
subsidized by unwitting investors.13  Unions, by contrast, are organized for 
advocacy of workers interests, which could reasonably include political 
activity.  The obvious differences between these entities should counsel for 
different restrictions in any case, yet the law treats unions and corporations 
essentially as alter egos. The rationales originally made to justify corporate 
restrictions also appear in cases involving unions.14  Courts construe the law to 
apply to both forms of organization equivalently, regardless of obvious 
differences between them. 
Moreover, this “unfairness” argument provides little reason to bar 
incorporated not-for-profit groups or small for-profit concerns where there is 
not much capital accumulation from making expenditures.  It is also applied 
selectively to political activity, for no apparent reason.  It offers no distinction 
between corporate political expenditures, which are disallowed, and other 
corporate community spending one might deem ultra vires to the corporate 
purpose, such as subsidizing PBS, the local ballet, nonpartisan voter 
registration drives, or lobbying incumbent politicians.  Management’s choices 
in political spending should be regulated by internal corporate governance 
procedures, like these other types of social activism.15 
The Supreme Court has not completely ignored this issue.  In 
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), it concluded that certain 
corporations formed for the promotion of political ideas, which do not engage 
in business activity at all, do not have shareholders, and do not take corporate 
money, could be exempt from the laws prohibiting expenditures (and, later, 
electioneering communications) by corporations.16  The FEC’s implementing 
regulations require a host of certifications and filings for groups who want to 
 
 12. See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 154–155 (1998); Adam 
Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 
GEO. L.J. 871, 873 (2004) [hereinafter Winkler, “Other People’s Money”]. 
 13. Winkler, “Other People’s Money,” supra note 12, at 874–75. 
 14. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
 15. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2002). 
 16. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986).  But, they would not 
be exempt from laws prohibiting contributions, according to a subsequent Court ruling in FEC v. 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
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take advantage of this paltry exception, and it has not proved a useful 
liberating tool for group political speech.17 
In the end, the MCFL exception is no solution to the overbreadth of the 
corporate and labor ban.  It provides partial relief to a small set of corporations 
willing to comply with the requirements, and it offers no relief to small labor 
groups that might logically deserve it.  If “immense aggregations of wealth”18 
are the problem, then by simply applying a reasonable political expenditure 
limit to corporations (or unions), the law would reflect some sensitivity to 
legitimate speech interests. 
A second point often made in support of limiting participation by 
prohibited sources is that such participation is illegitimate because the 
prohibited sources are legal (fictitious) persons and, among other things, 
cannot vote.19 
This argument conflates the role of political speech in democracy with 
popular sovereignty, which is most directly articulated through voting.  First 
Amendment protection has never been limited to just those speakers eligible to 
vote.  The franchise, even today, is confined by state (and federal) law by age, 
status as a felon, period of domicile, mental capacity, citizenship, and 
registration requirements.20  No one has ever suggested that these factors 
diminish the political speech rights of other persons ineligible to vote. 
Nor is there any rationale for burdening speech by a group.  In fact, since 
regulation of group speech implicates not only protected speech rights but also 
protected associational liberties, one would expect First Amendment doctrine 
to have developed an even more rigorous standard for upholding such laws.  
This sentiment emerges from time to time in particular contexts, but as of yet 
 
 17. “MCFL” corporations are called “qualified nonprofit corporations” in FEC regulations, 
and they are defined at 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (2007). 
 18. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007) (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)) (emphasis added). 
 19. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 
1977) (stating corporations do not have the same First Amendment rights as persons), rev’d, 435 
U.S. 765 (1978); EDWIN EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 268–83 (1969) 
(discussing arguments about legitimacy of corporate political action); Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & 
Kenneth D. Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. § 441b and the Superior Rights of 
Natural Persons, 14 PAC. L.J. 209, 217 (1983); Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Belotti: The 
Corporate Political Contribution Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 311–15 (2006) (summarizing cases 
evaluating corporate speech rights).  Contra First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
(1978). 
 20. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (felon restriction); Marston v. 
Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (registration requirements); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970) (age restriction), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; 
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d. Cir. 2004) (felon restriction), vacated, 449 F.3d 371 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
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an overall rule specially protecting groups as such has not emerged.21  The 
Court in WRTL II could have focused on this aspect of the problem, but did 
not. 
A third justification for the corporate and labor expenditure ban is that this 
activity poses a special danger of corruption because these speakers seek self-
interested legislation, rather than good government. 
News accounts and court briefs in campaign finance cases recite a litany of 
situations where corporate wealth is used to “buy” legislation and corrupt 
officeholders.  But these situations rarely involve the activity under scrutiny in 
Wisconsin Right to Life—independent spending by a “prohibited source” from 
its own funds.  Instead, they typically involve fundraising or gratuities, often 
by people attempting to avoid disclosure or limits on contributions.22  Teapot 
Dome was a gratuities scandal; Watergate was a multifaceted event, involving 
abuse of office and hidden financing; and Charles Keating used legal 
fundraising as an “in” to specific helpful Senators.23  Whatever the merits of 
this quasi-bribery argument in those contexts, it is misplaced as a rationale for 
restrictions on independent spending. 
A final point made on behalf of the corporate and labor expenditure bans 
argues from tradition, history, and convention.  Prohibited sources have been 
“prohibited” for generations; numerous precedents support these restrictions; 
and there should not be any question that Congress may regulate their political 
activity. 
Justice Souter’s WRTL II dissent, for one, argues that the Court’s 
intervention into campaign finance regulation threatens democratic integrity 
preserved by this long history of regulation.24  Since the passage of the Tillman 
Act in 1907, corporations have been prohibited from making contribution to 
federal candidates,25 and since 1946, corporations and unions have been barred 
from making expenditures.26  It, therefore, might seem that an enforcement 
record demonstrating the scope and contours of these laws must have helped 
 
 21. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (holding 
unconstitutional a city ordinance limiting contributions by associations); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963) (holding that the activities of the NAACP are modes of expression and 
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which may not be prohibited); 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 
1945) (1835). 
 22. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Abramoff  Pleads Guilty to 3 Counts, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1. 
 23. LARRY SABATO & GLENN SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF 
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 8–15 (1996). 
 24. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 25. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864; FEC, THIRTY YEAR REPORT 3 (2005). 
 26. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 159-160; FEC, supra note 25, at 4. 
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inform Congress when it recodified this prohibition in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA).27 
However, the Department of Justice brought a few test cases enforcing the 
expenditure ban against unions and lost.28  It pursued a singular corporate 
prosecution in the 1960s.29  Contemporaneous public statements suggest that 
the Department doubted any prosecution of expenditures (as distinguished 
from contributions) would be constitutional.30  Yet since the passage of FECA, 
the Court has reinterpreted history and summarily justified the prohibited 
source restrictions in broad and conclusory terms. 
If the Court were inclined to push a little, the fragile historical justification 
for blind acceptance of the prohibited source restrictions could fail.  The legal 
arguments rest on opaque reasoning from a 1957 labor case, articulated by the 
deferential Justice Felix Frankfurter in reliance on an unconvincing historical 
summary.31  The seminal Buckley v. Valeo decision had no occasion to 
reexamine the roots of the corporate or labor ban.32  The court in 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, as we saw above, articulated a constitutional 
exemption when presented with the expenditure ban in a nonprofit context.33  
Every other Court decision has relied, for better or worse, on a recitation of 
this shaky foundation. 
As a policy matter, times have changed.  The modern corporate landscape 
is quite different from 1907.  In 1920, there were roughly 3 corporations for 
every 1000 people in the United States; in 1990 there were 15 per 1000.34  “[A] 
corporate charter was a privilege to be granted only by a special act of a state 
legislature, and then for purposes clearly in the public interest.”35  Many 
 
 27. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431–55). 
 28. Mutch, supra note 19, at 304–07. 
 29. U.S. v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d. 710, 711 (9th Cir. 1966); see Mutch, supra note 21, at 
302-08. 
 30. Mutch, supra note 19, at 306–307, n.45 (citing Fed. Elections Act of 1955: Hearings on 
S. 636 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Comm. on Rules and 
Administration, 84th Cong. 210 (1955). (testimony of Warren Olney III, Assistant Attorney 
Gen.)). 
 31. See United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570–85 (1957). 
 32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 33. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 250–51 (1986). 
 34. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-51 (population figures), 3-496 
(corporation figures) (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2006).  According 
to this source, in 1920 there were 313,835 corporations and a population of 105,710,620; in 1990 
there were 3,716,650 corporations and a population of 248,709,873.  Id. 
 35. PATRICIA BEARD, AFTER THE BALL: GILDED AGE SECRETS, BOARDROOM BETRAYALS, 
AND THE PARTY THAT IGNITED THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL OF 1905 27 (2003) (quoting 
ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE 
GILDED AGE 6 (1982)). 
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entities that incorporate today do so for liability-limiting purposes, and they 
would not have sought a state corporate charter in 1907.  The corporate world 
was also much more concentrated then.  For example, in 1900 half of all 
American savings were held in life insurance or annuities, and insurance 
company assets were an important source of investment capital for other 
businesses.36 
When the Tillman Act passed in 1907, the nation was trying to cope with 
new and alarming “immense aggregations of wealth.”37  The Tillman Act’s 
remedy was a ban on all corporations making any kind of contribution.38  Such 
categorical breadth might be justifiable in an era of dramatic change, 
uncertainty, capital concentration, and anxiety.  But, today we have a mature 
corporate regulatory system. 
Today, any business association or civic group will probably be 
incorporated.  Even some blogs incorporate.  In the latest corporate tax data 
from 2002, the IRS reported that out of over 5.2 million corporations filing 
returns, 589,768 of them had no assets, almost 4 million corporations had 
assets from $1 to $500,000, and just under 2,000 had assets over 
$2,500,000,000.39  Roughly 47% of active corporations had no net income.40  
These figures do not include the almost 204,000 tax-exempt charities filing 
returns in 2002, or the 76,638 returns filed by other kinds of tax exempt 
entities like social welfare organizations and trade associations.41 
The role of unions in American life has also changed in the years since the 
expenditure ban was extended to them.  At the time of the expenditure ban, 
unions represented over one-third of the workforce.42  In 2005 that figure 
dropped to 12.5%, and union membership continues to fall in absolute 
numbers.43 
The reflexive supposition that the corporate or labor form necessarily leads 
to immense aggregations of wealth, so that any corporation or union, for-profit 
or not-for-profit, national or local, must be barred from making expenditures, is 
not borne out in reality.  Moreover, these groups should be able to speak on 
 
 36. Id. at 10. 
 37. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007) (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
 38. FEC, supra note 25, at 3. 
 39. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2002 RETURNS OF ACTIVE CORPORATIONS, TABLE 2 –
BALANCE SHEET, INCOME STATEMENT AND SELECTED OTHER ITEMS, BY SIZE OF TOTAL ASSETS 
(2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02co02nr.xls. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Michael Wachter, The Rise and Fall of Unions, REGULATION, Summer 2007, at 27. 
 43. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007 424 
(126th ed. 2006). 
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their own.  The reasons for prohibiting independent spending are not well-
settled in the law and beg for reexamination. 
If the Court takes political speech rights seriously, it should revisit the 
prohibited source spending prohibition and either build a reasoned justification 
for it or find it unconstitutional.  If the Court declared the independent 
expenditure ban unconstitutional, how might the universe of money in politics 
change? 
First, some resources now spent on “issue advertising” would instead be 
spent on campaign advertising for or against candidates.  These corporations 
and unions would be able to do directly what they may now be doing 
indirectly—reach the public to talk about who should be elected.  Other 
spenders now chilled by the law (and the controversy that accompanies 
political spending) might decide to participate. One cannot say for certain 
whether these additional risk-adverse spenders would offer something different 
in the debate, but it could be that the risk-tolerant activists are more 
ideologically polarized and resilient to controversy than these new arrivals.  
Liberalizing the expenditure restrictions could encourage more moderate 
perspectives. 
Second, while some media companies would use in-house resources to 
advocate for campaigns, there are other restraints that will limit that use.  For 
broadcasters, FCC licensing requirements and review could limit how far any 
particular broadcaster could go.44  Moreover, these speakers would be 
especially sensitive to adding any content that would alienate their audiences.  
For example, a viewer who dislikes the parade of political content on A&E 
will change the channel; but a consumer who disagrees with UPS’s political 
agenda may still use them to ship a package. 
Third, the “business” or labor perspective as such would be expressed, not 
shielded through middlemen as it is presently.  While some have long argued 
that only “natural” persons are entitled to participate in politics,45 this cramped 
view is legally unsound and bad policy.  It excludes from the arena a large 
variety of significant perspectives.  Individual shareholders, employees, or 
workers may not fully appreciate how different issues affect corporations or 
unions in society, even if they are sympathetic to their goals. 
Moreover, the existing limits confine corporations and unions to giving 
opinions on laws and legislation not on lawmakers. Since corporations cannot 
speak in federal campaigns, concerns that a business may have with its 
congressional representative are managed in the lobbying arena, which is 
exclusively the territory of incumbents and professional government affairs 
representatives.  It would be better if these economic and policy disputes were 
 
 44. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2002). 
 45. See, e.g., Richard W. Emory, A Corrupt Practices Act for Maryland, 4 MD. L. REV. 248, 
256 (1940). 
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pulled into home-district campaigns so that challengers could also speak to 
them. 
Nothing in the above argument would abolish federal or state laws 
prohibiting direct corporate contributions to candidates, parties, and political 
committees, nor would it abrogate existing laws treating coordinated 
expenditures as contributions.  The most difficult principle to justify in 
Wisconsin Right to Life and the other expenditure cases is that there is 
something inherently corrupt about independent corporate and labor political 
speech.  That is the piece of constitutional doctrine that needs to be revisited. 
Even if there is a real danger behind corporate and labor speech, it is 
difficult to argue that a ban is a tailored response.  If Congress is concerned 
about corporations and unions drowning out parties and candidates through 
independent media spending, then it should consider some reasonable cap 
coupled with disclosure.  These groups could then make whatever political 
point they preferred without dancing around with the express advocacy 
standard or the electioneering communications ban; the public could be better 
informed; and incidental or isolated political activity would not violate the 
law.46 
As technology progresses, it becomes harder to justify limited political 
spending on the basis of legal form. With each passing day, viewers have more 
choices for how to receive material they want and avoid material they do not 
want. The “disproportionate influence” argument, presented as the first 
possible rationale in this discussion made some sense in an era with three 
networks, a handful of independent stations, no remotes, and no TiVo.  This 
justification does not hold up in an era where “television” video comes over 
the internet and software analogous to a pop-up blocker deletes any 
advertising, political or commercial, a viewer does not want to see.  What is 
the justification for protecting viewers from material they choose to watch? 
What harm might corporate and union prohibitions do?  As Alexander 
Heard noted in 1960: 
 By far the most important political impact of both business and labor forces is 
felt not through their financial part in politics, but through the web of personal 
and institutional influences by which they are linked to large numbers of 
people in relationships of dependence and respect.  And here a point is 
reached beyond which the effort to put a dollar value on political participation 
and political influence becomes meaningless.47 
In other words, established economic players have a variety of means by which 
to work their influence.  The ability to make independent expenditures is, by 
 
 46. An alternative approach would be to place corporate or labor governance restrictions on 
such expenditures to protect the interests of shareholders and union members, such as disclosure 
or requiring a ratifying vote. 
 47. ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 206 (1960) (emphasis added). 
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contrast, something a new player lacking such connections could use.  The law 
at present prevents many from doing so.  When individuals and entities from 
outside the “web of personal and institutional influences” are silenced, it 
makes it just that much better for those already “in relationships of dependence 
and respect.” 
If the Court declines to revisit the prohibited source ban in federal law, 
Congress should take up the challenge.  If lawmakers wish to institute a more 
straightforward and effective campaign finance system that creates fewer 
distortions, thus enhancing political debate, compliance, and respect for the 
rules, they should at least revisit the expenditure bans on corporations and 
labor organizations.  As they are presently configured, these rules prohibit 
some political activity by certain entities for reasons that are hard to fathom.  
They serve the interests of those who seek grounds for investigating their 
political opponents, or for those left relatively more influential by the silencing 
of competing views. 
